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Macroprudential Policy: What Does It Really Mean 
By Claude Lopez, Donald Markwardt and Keith Savard 
Before the global financial crisis unfolded, imbalances and risks within the financial structure had 
accumulated to such a level that they jeopardized the entire system and—absent unprecedented 
and extraordinary interventions by central banks and governments— threatened to devastate 
the real economy. Prior to 2007, a financial event such as a speculative bubble in the housing 
market or the downfall of a systemically important “too big to fail” institution might have been 
viewed as an isolated event, with blame laid solely on participants or regulators in the particular 
industry. With hindsight it has become evident that these seemingly unrelated risks of price 
bubbles or susceptibility to financial contagion are in fact closely intertwined. These intimate 
linkages and risk exposures among financial system participants pose serious threats to economic 
growth. 
Ironically, the quiet buildup of financial “fault lines” leading up to the crisis was due in part to 
financial institutions’ and regulators’ growing overconfidence in their ability to micromanage 
risks on an individual, or firm, level, without regard for broader systemic impact. Financial 
institutions were confident they had eliminated most of their risks by hedging their known 
idiosyncratic (individual) risks with products like credit default swaps, and diversifying exposures 
based on historical return relationships (e.g. real estate performance is a mostly local 
phenomenon so a sustained nationwide downturn is mathematically near impossible). 
Regulators monitored individual financial institutions to attempt to ensure that no single body 
was taking outsize risks. Regulators and financial institutions alike failed to anticipate that the 
burgeoning use of securitized products like credit default swaps could create harder-to-assess 
risk exposures among institutions such as banks, and that small destabilizing forces could ripple 
into catastrophic market disturbances in a fragile system. 
POLICY OBJECTIVE LEVEL OF IMPACT 
MONETARY Price stability Macro: stable economic 
growth 
MACROPRUDENTIAL Stability of financial sector Both macro and micro 
MICROPRUDENTIAL Stability of financial 
institutions 
Micro: protection of 
consumers 
 
It is clear then why the crisis has highlighted the need for macroprudential supervision that takes 
a wider view of the financial system, beyond (but in complement to) traditional microprudential 
regulation. Macroprudential supervision is concerned with the stability of entire industries and 
the health of the relationships within the financial sector that can significantly impact the 
economy. While macroprudentialism has no precise definition, its principal goal is to monitor 
systemic risk.i Such risk is a negative externality created by financial institutions that do not fully 
bear the cost of their actions but affect other participants in the financial system. It can manifest 
in two dimensions: across institutions (contagion risk) or across the financial cycle (procyclical 
risk). These risk dimensions are closely linked and their problems often accumulate at the same 
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time—to participate in and enhance gains during an upswing in the financial cycle, firms can 
increase leverage and concentrate that leverage in opaque but intimately connected areas of the 
financial system.  
A new framework to fill the gap 
Just as microprudential policy is too narrow in scope to take on these broader challenges, 
monetary policy is too blunt an instrument to address systemic risk in the financial system. 
Macroprudential supervision is emerging as a critical tool to fill this gap, where it can help 
coordinate policies and supervision among existing microprudential and monetary tools. With 
such supervision still in its nascent stages, consensus must still be developed on the best way to 
monitor or measure systemic risk. In the event that such risks to the financial system are reliably 
detected, questions remain as to what sort of actions—if any—are most desirable under a 
macroprudential framework.  
Empirical evidence may serve as a guide to assessing the efficacy of various macroprudential 
policies. Naturally, one might look to Asian economies that have been leaders in implementing 
macroprudential supervision and countercyclical measures. Studies have found many of these 
wide-ranging policies successful in achieving their objectives, whether cooling housing markets 
(loan-to-value limits on mortgages) or dampening the extension of credit (levies on procyclical 
types of funding for banks).  
However, understanding how these policies can be effectively implemented in developed 
Western economies such as Europe or the United States is a major challenge. Many Asian 
countries that employed macroprudential measures were more closed economies, with the 
ability to simultaneously coordinate monetary and fiscal measures. In more open Western 
economies, autonomous action by monetary and fiscal decision-makers cloud the ability to 
assess whether similar policies could be orchestrated.  
Overall, the system-wide focus is clearly welcome in light of recent crises, yet many unknowns 
still exist as policymakers seek to move forward in adopting macroprudential tools. This report 
aims to clarify the current state of the discussion around macroprudential policies. More 
specifically, it highlights the strengths and limitations of these “trendy” tools, in order to identify 
those (if any) that can effectively enable policymakers to achieve their main objective (reduce 
the risk of crisis and lower any excessive procyclicality) while providing a better understanding of 
their cost. 
In this article, we provide an overview of macroprudential policy discussion from the 
fundamental rationales behind such policies to the set of measures currently used. Then we 
discuss in more details the notion of systemic risk, we finally discuss some of the challenges the 
implantation of these regulations may encounter. 
Macroprudential Policy:  Fundamental Rationales 
Most policymakers (governments, central banks, and international institutions) agree on the 
need for macroprudential policy to reduce systemic risk, whether it is to correct for market failure 
3 | P a g e  
 
or smooth financial cycles. Unfortunately, macroprudential principles are not the main 
motivation for this consensus in an environment where monetary and fiscal policies have very 
little room left to maneuver. The guidelines proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) in Basel III provide a rather telling story: They are mostly based on existing 
microprudential and regulatory tools to which “Pigouvian” taxes and levies have been added to 
meet their new macroprudential objectives. ii,iii  
Understanding the fundamental rationales behind macroprudential policy is essential to 
appreciate how it complements monetary, fiscal and structural policies. Indeed, financial 
regulatory policies are not enough to address systemic risk, and other policies—especially 
monetary and fiscal policy—also have roles to play. Coordination among monetary, fiscal and 
macro- and microprudential policies is essential, nationally as well as internationally. 
The underlying causes of contagion or procyclicality risks dictate the type of policy required. 
Aggregate shocks such as commodity price shocks and policy deficiencies such as poorly 
conducted microprudential and monetary policies can generate both types of risk. Yet 
macroprudential policy would not be the appropriate answer in either case. 
Externalities and market failures arising from various financial frictions and market imperfections 
should motivate macroprudential polices, especially when microprudential supervision and 
monetary policy are conducted effectively. The 2007-08 crisis illustrates that spillovers across 
financial institutions and between the financial sector and the real economy are the key market 
failures that create systemic risk. Since then, these externalities have been commonly classified 
following two dimensions: 
 Contagion risk: excessive concentration of risk among a few highly interconnected groups, 
as with too-big-to-fail institutions, which can take down the wider financial system when 
destabilized. 
 Procyclical risk: the underlying buildup of risks over time that are hidden and underpriced. 
In this case, the financial sector generates systemic risk endogenously.  
Hence, the macroprudential toolbox should focus on these two dimensions. However, financial 
regulatory policies are not enough to address systemic risk.  
Theoretically, the set of macroprudential tools available is quite large as it includes existing 
microprudential and other regulatory tools, taxes and levies, as well as new instruments. In 
practice, however, the IMF has identified 18 main instruments, and in 2013 it launched a survey 
on Global Macroprudential Policy Instruments (GMPI) in which central banks or national 
authorities disclosed which they were using. The following table classifies the measures around 
three main axes (housing, contagion, and reserve requirements) and summarizes their usage in 
2013.iv  
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Macroprudential measures: type and usage 
Measures in 2013 Advanced economies   Emerging economies 
  Total Pct.   Total Pct. 
Housing-related           
Loan-to-value related measures 24 40%   30 26% 
Debt-to-income ratio 6 10%   11 10% 
Dynamic loan-loss provisioning 1 2%   5 4% 
General countercyclical capital buffer 2 3%   0 0% 
            
Contagion           
Leverage ratio 4 7%   3 3% 
Capital surcharges on SIFIs 2 3%   3 3% 
Limits on interbank exposures 4 7%   11 10% 
Concentration limits 7 12%   19 17% 
Limits on domestic currency loan 0 0%   4 4% 
Levy/tax on financial institutions 6 10%   5 4% 
            
Reserve requirements            
Limits on foreign currency loans 2 3%   7 6% 
Reserve requirements-related 
measures 2 3%   16 14% 
Sources: Cerutti et al. (2015)v. 
Several of the macroprudential instruments reported in the table can address both the contagion 
and the procyclical risks. As a result, since each tool has unique advantages and limitations, a 
combination is likely to provide a better solution to the problem of correcting the same 
externality. Overall, the use of macroprudential tools has become more frequent and varied over 
the years, across all the countries considered. In 2013, closed or emerging economies have used 
instruments related to contagion and housing in roughly equal amounts, while using many of the 
reserve requirement instruments as well, which they consider monetary tools. In contrast, open 
or advanced economies favor measures related to housing but also use some of the contagion-
risk instruments. Among the instruments available, both emerging and advanced countries prefer 
loan-to-value-related measures and debt-to-income-ratio. In addition, emerging countries use 
concentration limits and reserve requirement measures quite frequently, which is consistent 
with their concerns about large, volatile capital flows and related systemic risks.  
Interestingly, the tools considered to date are mostly based on existing microprudential tools 
that are adaptable to macroprudential objectives. These tools are part of the road map proposed 
in Basel III to mitigate systemic risk.  
Systemic Risk and Basel III framework 
The regulations suggested in Basel III  address the systemic risk issue by (i) significantly increasing 
capital buffers for risks related to the interconnectedness of the major dealers and (ii) 
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incentivizing institutions to reduce counterparty risk through clearing and active management 
(hedging).vi  
While the first point aims at reducing the contagion risk generated by global systemically 
important financial institutions (G‑SIFIs), current initiatives focus mostly on banks. Every year, 
the Financial Stability Board and similar institutions in other countries publish a list of global and 
domestic/national systemically important banks (G‑SIBs and D/N-SIBs) based on a methodology 
that refers to size, interconnectedness, cross-border activity, the lack of available substitutes, 
and complexity. Then, each country applies its regulatory measures (Dodd-Frank for the United 
States) such as higher loss absorbency, more intensive scrutiny, and resolution planning 
requirements.  
The second point aims at reducing procyclical risk. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-
varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement. The countercyclical capital 
buffers are intended to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and 
thereby enhance medium-term prospects for the economy. In good times when system-wide 
risks are growing, the regulators could impose counter-capital buffers, which would help the 
banks withstand losses in bad times. Basell III suggests credit per GDP as the proxy for the 
financial cycle. 
Basel III represents a significant cooperation and coordination effort across G-20 countries. Yet 
its guidelines or, more precisely, their implementation at the country level raises many questions. 
At this stage of the Basel III process, two main drawbacks should be highlighted. First, will 
stabilizing the banking sector be enough to stabilize the whole financial system? Indeed, the 
current thrust of regulation could create powerful incentives to move financing from the banking 
system to unregulated financial institutions and securitization. Second, will policymakers be able 
to reliably identify the buildup of financial risks in order to effectively lean against the cycle? Even 
when excesses are evident, assessing their impact on the real economy and weighing them 
against the effects of tighter macroprudential policy are quite challenging. The difficulties range 
from the risk of diagnostic error (both Type I and II) to how to account for country circumstances 
and characteristics (financial structure, industrial organization and ownership structure, 
openness, exchange rate regime, international financial integration, political economy, etc.). 
Systemic Risk and Contagion 
In the absence of consensus regarding the most effective methodology for assessing the 
resilience of financial systems, the Basel III framework advocates country-specific stress tests. As 
a result, central banks such as the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Federal 
Reserve evaluate their system’s capital adequacy, on a yearly basis, relying on 
supervisory/confidential data. The outcome of these tests may lead to policy responses if the 
level of capitalization is deemed unsatisfactory based on Basel III guidelines (or more accurately, 
with the country’s regulations derived from Basel III, such as Dodd-Frank for the U.S.). Yet, these 
tests are country- or currency-area-specific and thus difficult to compare. 
As an alternative, Acharya et al. (2010a, b, 2012) and Brownlees and Engle (2011) propose a 
measure of systemic risk (SRISK) that relies solely on publicly available market data.vii Similar to 
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the stress tests, the SRISK measure represents the capital a financial institution would need to 
raise during severe marketwide downturns to function normally.  It has several interesting 
features (i) it is available for several countries, (ii) it accounts for the endogeneous nature of the 
systemic risk, which makes it macroprudential based, (iii) its assessment does not depend on 
Basel risk regulation (capital ratio measurement), and (iv) it has a higher frequency—bimonthly 
instead of yearly. 
Systemic risk and Financial Cycle 
Basel III guidelines are more specific when it comes to the financial cycle.1 They recommend a 
formula that translates the credit gap measure into activation of the countercyclical capital buffer 
(CCB). The CCB should be imposed if the credit-to-GDP ratio exceeds its trend value. More 
specifically, threshold values of the gap are used to define when the buffer should be deployed. 
If the gap is below 2 percent, the CCB is zero. If the gap is above 10 percent, the CCB should be 
set at its maximum of 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets.viii
 
Between the lower and upper 
threshold, the CCB should vary with the extent of the buildup of systemic risk.  
While an aggregate indicator for credit is useful, knowing the source and quality of the credit is 
essential when assessing whether a policy response is needed and how it should be calibrated. 
Monitoring systemic risk within the financial cycle requires correct evaluation of both the stage 
of the credit cycle relative to its long-term behavior and the propagation of financial risks or 
systemic risk spillovers. The credit-to-GDP ratio captures only the first. 
Following Shin and Shin (2011), Lopez et al (2015) build an alternative indicator using the 
composition of bank funding.ix The idea is that funding markets are the balance-sheet 
counterpart to intermediate lending, and they can be sorted around two categories:  
- Core liabilities, namely retail deposits of domestic household and business, which are stable 
and grow in line with the economy.x 
- Non-core liabilities, encompassing the other major forms of funding such as lending between 
banks or foreign lending, are more volatile. Non-core liabilities include funding sources for 
banks—and, in more mature financial markets, other financial intermediaries. 
In times of “excessive” credit growth, non-core liabilities increase in order to fund the fast-
growing lending that cannot be accommodated by core liabilities. Both liabilities should provide 
useful signals on financial conditions. Hence we calculate two indicators:xi 
- Non-core liabilities to GDP ratio: Normalizing by the level of economic activity allows a better 
understanding of the size of the financial market and its non-core fraction relative to the size 
of the real economy. While directly comparable to the credit-to-GDP ratio, it also shares its 
main drawback: GDP is a poor “real-time” measure because it is often revised.   
- Non-core to total liabilities ratio: increasing proportions of non-core funding relative to core 
deposits could indicate a credit market that is “overheating.” Focusing on the composition of 
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the financial system enables the buildup of one funding method or intermediary to be 
monitored (see appendix for more detail). 
These indicators are complementary in the effort to understand the vulnerability of a country’s 
financial market based on its reliance on short-term funding or short-term foreign currency debt 
as well as type of lender. Both sets of information are essential when designing well-targeted 
policy. Finally, the composition of the economy’s non-core liabilities may also indicate a buildup 
of systemic risk as non-core liabilities are often in foreign currencies, cross-held by other 
intermediaries, and/or of shorter duration than retail deposits.xii 
Non-Core Liabilities ratios 
 
 
Source: Lopez et al. (2015). 
The figures show the components of financial companies’ liabilities, disaggregated by type of 
financial institution and liability category. Segments in blue/purple hues indicate liabilities of 
depository corporations (or monetary financial institutions for euro area economies), which 
include institutions traditionally thought of as banks—those that accept deposits. Liabilities of 
other financial corporations (OFCs) are displayed in orange/red. OFCs include but are not limited 
to insurance companies, funding corporations, and holding companies. Liabilities issued by OFCs 
can be considered borrowing to fund “shadow banking” activity. The figures below confirm that 
shadow banking has a prominent role in the U.S.. In contrast, South Korea is is far less dependent 
on non-core liabilities to fund banking operations.  
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Common factors and challenges  
Macroprudential index versus Non-Core (NC) liability-based ratiosxiii 
 
Source: Lopez et al. (2015). 
Looking coincidentally at the macroprudential index and the non-core liabilities-based ratios (per 
GDP and per total liabilities) for some countries, the previous figure highlights common factors 
across countries with the strongest macroprudential stances.  
With the exception of Singapore and Hong Kong, which are special cases as leading international 
financial centers, the financial markets of the countries recording at least four macroprudential 
measures depend overwhelmingly on banks’ core funding, as both liabilities-based ratios are 
below 50 percent. In other words, these countries have limited depth in their financial systems 
relative to their real economies and have relatively “simple” financial structures, with banks more 
important than capital markets. Whether they are closed emerging economies (Malaysia, and 
Turkey), closed advanced economies (Korea, Singapore) or open advanced economies (Hong 
Kong, and the Netherlands), their access to autonomous monetary policy is restricted. Whether 
this is due to proactive exchange rate management, greater carry-trade inflows or being part of 
a monetary union, the outcome is the same: Macroprudential policy seems to be an alternative 
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to monetary policy for reining in domestic liquidity. Finally, most of these countries have more 
concentrated institutional systems (industrial organization, ownership structure, central bank 
and government), which makes the implementation of these tools easier. 
Unlike the countries previously discussed, the euro zone, the UK, and the U.S. are relatively large, 
open economies with well-developed and complex institutions. For instance, in the U.S., less than 
half of total liabilities outstanding can be linked to bank balance sheets, while more than half can 
be attributed to the so-called shadow banking system. In Europe, banks are still responsible for 
the majority of financial intermediation. In France, they count for close to 60 percent of total 
liabilities, although the share of non-bank financial intermediation has increased. Furthermore, 
the recent crisis showed these countries tend to influence the global financial cycle. Monitoring 
systemic risk is essential for them as they actively contribute to it, yet the complexity of these 
advanced Western economies makes the task extremely challenging. 
Beyond their macroeconomic conditions, their network of international banks need to be taken 
into account because they may exacerbate policy’s unintended consequences. A very open 
capital account and large foreign bank presence make circumvention of the rules more likely. 
Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014) show that foreign bank branches increased their lending in 
the UK in response to tighter measures applied to local banks, a sign of cross-border competition 
and regulatory arbitrage.xiv Similarly, as supervisors required UK-based banks and their 
subsidiaries to meet higher capital requirements during the 2000s, local banks lent less abroad. 
In the presence of independent monetary policy, its interaction with macroprudential policy 
cannot be ignored and should be managed. So far, only the Bank of England hosts both the 
Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee, which is responsible for 
macroprudential measures. The U.S. Federal Reserve has some macroprudential tools, but others 
are dispersed among several agencies. The ECB’s main difficulty is the key difference between 
macroprudential and monetary policies: Macroprudential policy must be country-specific and is 
sensitive to a country’s political pressure while it must be coherent for the euro zone as a unit.  
 
Macroprudential Policy and Institutional Framework  
Because macroprudential policy is at an early stage of implementation, it faces a number of 
crucial issues. One of the most important is building—or refining—its institutional underpinnings. 
A strong institutional framework is essential to ensure that the policy can work effectively. As 
noted by the IMF and others, the framework must foster the ability to act in the face of evolving 
systemic threats, assuring access to information and defining an appropriate range and reach of 
macroprudential instruments. It needs to establish strong accountability and compel assertive 
and timely action, despite lobbying by the financial industry or political pressure.  
For many countries, the central bank has been the focal point for macroprudential policy. In 
instances where powers have been delegated to central banks, they also can be revoked by 
politicians, especially where macroprudential mandates remain vague and allow considerable 
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discretion. Paradoxically, high levels of central bank discretion and empowerment are likely to 
increase the political questioning and scrutiny they can expect.  
If central banks are to build support for macroprudential regulation, they will have to cogently 
explain the public and social purpose this policy serves. Simply speaking about the importance of 
financial stability is unlikely to be successful, reflecting the public’s inclination toward financial 
stability myopia and time inconsistent preferences. In the end, the failure to build broader 
rationales and constituencies will damage their capacity to fulfill their new regulatory role. 
However, cultivating constituencies and a broader sense of purpose for this project potentially 
erodes central banks’ claims to technically impartial and nonpolitical authority.  
Although central banks are playing a key role in the exercise of macroprudential policy, they are 
not the only institutions involved. Participation by government departments and regulatory 
agencies can help bring about the effective use of macroprudential tools. In addition, 
governments can be useful in ensuring the support of tax policy and facilitating legislative 
changes to mitigate systemic risk by creating regulatory authority over nonbank lenders and 
other institutions. 
Because the relationship between central banks and government institutions is at an early stage 
when it comes to managing macroprudential policy, challenges are still being identified. For now, 
it is safe to say that if institutional silos and rivalries develop, it could hinder risk identification 
and mitigation, undermining the effectiveness of the policy. The overlap among policy areas is 
another major challenge. There is also a political challenge in the relationship between finance 
ministries and central banks on macroprudential questions, given that many decisions will have 
fiscal as well as financial and monetary implications with institutional politics at play.   
Macroprudential Policy and the Political Landscape 
Macroprudential policy by most standards is a new field and it is hard to say how it will play out 
politically. Among the unknowns is the degree of involvement from politicians and industry 
players as well as the attitudes of the wider public toward the tactics and tools used to conduct 
policy. Assessing how the institutional design of macroprudential frameworks will interact with 
the wider political process requires some degree of speculation.  
At this point, the intervention of politicians generally has been limited. Legislation identifying 
broad aspects of the policy and its operation has been agreed. However, much of the detail has 
been left to government and central bank officials to figure out. In the United States, the system 
for implementing macroprudential tools and measures is composed of many independent 
regulators, each of whom has mandates focused on particular institutions or markets. The 
legislation governing each agency limits its objectives and the reach of its regulations. No agency 
has the explicit objective of maintaining financial stability—for taking into account the 
macroprudential add-ons to microprudential oversight.  
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), created as part of the Dodd-Frank legislation, 
has made progress in promoting cooperation among many agencies in the context of shared 
goals but isn’t as effective as it needs to be in the balkanized U.S. regulatory system. The fact that 
the FSOC has to make recommendations on a comply-or-explain basis indicates difficulties and 
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shortcomings in the political process. At minimum, the FSOC structure needs to be changed to 
enhance its independence and its ability to take unpopular stands, especially on countercyclical 
macroprudential policy.  
At its core, the emerging political economy of macroprudential regulation suffers from a political 
constituency problem. As Claudio Borio of the Bank for International Settlements recounts, there 
is no readymade constituency against the inebriating feeling of growing rich that is characteristic 
of a financial boom (Borio, 2013).xv Unlike monetary policy, whose prowess in fighting inflation 
can be linked to an individual’s own welfare, a macroprudential perspective alludes to 
systemically beneficial outcomes only tenuously associated with individual gains. In this type of 
circumstance, it is understandable that politicians might not want to be associated with a policy 
that could be viewed as “taking away the punch bowl.”    
Concluding remarks 
The macroprudential framework and the regulations implemented in various countries are still a 
work in progress. So far, most regulations focus on banks, whether the banking system represents 
20 percent or 100 percent of a nation’s financial sector.  
The success of these regulations in promoting financial stability remains unclear and their 
potential unexpected consequences quite unsettling, as financial activities tend to migrate to 
less regulated markets with the resulting risks often underestimated. As Goodhart’s law (1975) 
states: “Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it 
for control purposes.”xvi 
At the recent “Rethinking Macro Policy III” conference in Washington, D.C., IMF Chief Economist 
Olivier Blanchard said: “Policymakers cannot be simple observers, as what the financial system 
will be depends very much on regulation. And we do not have a good sense of what regulation 
should be.” Such a warning should encourage policymakers to acquire a better understanding of 
the issues before trying to regulate them. Already, we have learned from Basel I, II and III that 
failing to heed the financial sector’s reaction to proposed changes in policy and regulation leads 
to more complex and less efficient measures. What about changing strategy and trying a 
“transparent and constructive” dialogue as a starting point?  
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ix Shin and Shin (2010) consider one country: South Korea. Shin, Hyun Song, and Kwanho Shin. 
“Procyclicality and Monetary Aggregates,” NBER working paper 16836, 2010. 
Lopez, Claude, Markwardt, Donald and Keith Savard, “Macroprudential Policy, Silver Bullet or 
Refighting the Last War”, Milken Institute Report, 2015. 
x Our definitions are in line with IMF’s core and non-core liquidity definition (2015). The data are 
collected from national and international institutions’ websites such as IMF, central banks, and 
regulatory agencies. Harutyunyan, Artak, Alexander Massara, Giovanni Ugazio, Goran Amidzic, 
and Richard Walton. “Shedding Light on Shadow Banking,” IMF working paper 1, 2015. 
xi More information on the non-core liabilities ratio. The composition of the economy’s non-
core liabilities may also indicate a buildup of systemic risk as non-core liabilities are often in 
foreign currencies, cross-held by other intermediaries, and/or of shorter duration than retail 
deposits. 
In Fig Box a, components of financial companies’ liabilities are disaggregated by type of financial 
institution and liability category. Segments in blue/purple hues indicate liabilities of depository 
corporations (or monetary financial institutions for euro area economies), which include 
institutions traditionally thought of as banks—those that accept deposits. Liabilities of other 
financial corporations (OFCs) are displayed in orange/red. OFCs include but are not limited to 
insurance companies, funding corporations, and holding companies.  
Liabilities issued by OFCs can be considered borrowing to fund “shadow banking” activity. The 
figures below confirm that shadow banking has a more prominent role in developed economies 
such as Japan and the U.S. than in developing economies. This disparity is slightly more 
pronounced in the charts given that some emerging Asian central banks (South Korea, Malaysia) 
do not report balance sheet data for OFCs. Little data is available because their OFC sectors are 
not sufficiently developed to be measured. Indeed, Indonesia and Thailand have begun reporting 
OFC liabilities, but they represent less than 8 percent of total core and non-core liabilities. 
When viewed through the lens of non-core liabilities as a ratio of either core liabilities or the 
country’s gross domestic product, it is evident that emerging Asian economies are far less 
dependent on non-core liabilities to fund banking operations. The United States, by contrast, 
experienced remarkable growth in OFC liabilities in recent decades while depository institution 
liabilities remained somewhat level (below 25 percent).  
xii Types of non-core liabilities 
Liabilities to non-residents : While domestic retail deposits are considered part of banks’ core 
funding because of their stability, deposits from non-residents fall under non-core liabilities 
because they lack the same type of stability and can be subject to sudden withdrawals or 
reversals in the event of crisis. Foreign currency deposits cause a currency mismatch between 
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the foreign currencies the bank borrows in and the domestic currency it lends to residents. Such 
currency mismatches—which were at the heart of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s—
increase systemic risk in the banking sector, especially in emerging markets. 
Loans : This category is made up primarily of repurchase agreements, or “repos,” which are 
effectively collateralized loans. Repos are a popular form of short-term borrowing for financial 
institutions. Often, repurchase agreements last just one day and are subsequently “rolled over” 
in a cycle of very-short-term borrowing. Due to their short-term nature and being subject to 
haircuts or rollover risk during times of financial distress, repos can be considered a less stable 
source of funding than core deposits.  
Securities other than shares: Securities other than shares are any kind of negotiable debt 
instrument, including bonds, commercial paper, and certificates of deposit. In developed 
economies, commercial paper has played a significant role in financial intermediaries’ ability to 
raise short-term debt. In early 2007 the U.S. financial sector had $1.8 trillion in commercial paper 
outstanding, before falling by nearly 20 percent as financial markets froze in the aftermath of the 
Lehman Brothers collapse. Vulnerability to such sudden, sharp funding reductions illustrate why 
these types of securities are considered “non-core” and their rapid buildup may indicate an 
accumulation of systemic risk. 
xiii Source: Lopez et al(2015). 
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xvi Goodhart, Charles. “Problems of Monetary Management: The U.K. Experience, Papers in 
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